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Introduction Few cases have affected the course of Indian law as greatly as Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.' Decided in 1955, it was the culmination of a line of Supreme Court decisions concerning aboriginal title, its status as "property," and the effect on that status of various kinds of "recognition." Plaintiffs were a group of Alaskan natives seeking compensation under the fifth amendment for a "taking" by the United States of timber from lands the plaintiffs claimed by aboriginal title. Denying that compensation was due, the Court declared that absent specific recognition as such by treaty or act of Congress, aboriginal title is not a property interest within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Recent scholarship has charged that Tee-Hit-Ton wrongly decided the issues presented. 2 Ironically, the issues the Court claimed to have decided probably were not presented in the first place. Through the combined misunderstanding of Court and counsel, most of the relevant issues in the case were never addressed. Instead, counsel argued and the Court "decided" a case that bore little resemblance to the one properly before the Court.
Shortly after Alaska was acquired, Congress deliberately did not provide Alaskan native lands the legislative protection traditionally afforded Indian lands elsewhere. 3 Adopting a different policy in Alaska, Congress refused to protect aboriginal title per se, although it did act to protect native possession. Through special legislation, most significantly the 1884 Alaska Organic Act, 4 Congress created various imperfect rights in favor of both In 1884 the first Organic Act for Alaska extended the laws of Oregon over Alaska, so far as applicable, and provided for the appointment of a governor to sit in Sitka.' 3 Alaska was constituted a land district, the general mining laws' 4 were declared to be in force, and those who had already located claims were allowed to perfect them." This was subject to the provision that "the Indians or other persons" in Alaska "shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them [,] but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress."' 6 Occupied lands up to 640 acres being used as missionary stations among the Indians were to "be continued in the occupancy" of the missionaries "until action by Congress." 7 A final proviso cautioned that "nothing contained in this act shall be construed to put in force" in Alaska "the general land laws of the United States." 8 Congress created the first Indian reservation in Alaska in 1891 when it set aside the Annette Islands Reserve for the Metlakatla Indians, a band that had immigrated from British Columbia four years earlier.' 9 Persons occupying lands in Alaska for purposes of trade or manufacture were allowed to receive patents to such lands not to exceed 160 acres, 20 but this rule did not extend to lands "to which the natives of Alaska have prior rights by virtue of actual occupation." ' 2 ' Provision was also made for entry of lands for townsite purposes under the general townsite laws, with tribes"; "uncivilized native tribes" were "those independent pagan tribes who acknowledged no allegiance to Russia ..... Id [VOL. 8
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no more than 640 acres to be embraced within any one entry. 22 The homestead laws 2 3 were extended to Alaska in 1898, but homesteads were to be limited to 80 acres; and neither entries nor acquisition of title to the shores of navigable waters were authorized. 2 The act also delegated to the Secretary of the Interior authority to "reserve for the use of the natives of Alaska suitable tracts of land along the water front of any stream, inlet, bay or sea shore for landing places for canoes and other craft" used by natives.
1
The second Organic Act in 1900 reorganized the civil government of Alaska and moved its seat to Juneau. 2 6 The act declared that the "Indians or other persons conducting schools or missions" in Alaska should not be disturbed in the possession of lands actually used or occupied, and directed the Secretary of the Interior to survey and issue to religious societies patents to lands, up to 640 acres, occupied by them as missionary stations among the Indians. 2 "
Although applicable, the General Allotment Act of 188728 was of little practical significance in Alaska. It authorized the creation of allotments only out of lands that were part of an Indian reservation; there were no Indian reservations in Alaska at the time. Congress corrected this situation in 1906 when it authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allot 160 acres of nonmineral land to any Indian or Eskimo meeting certain qualifications. 29 Such persons were given a preference right to secure an allotment to nonmineral land they occupied. The allotments were to be inalienable and nontaxable until otherwise provided.
In 1912 the third Organic Act provided for a territorial 
. "I'
The newly created territorial legislature in 1915 enacted the Indian 'Village Act allowing any native village of at least forty permanent inhabitants to organize a municipal government." In 1926, Congress provided for the issuance of deeds to lands set apart for Indians and Eskimos within townsites entered and surveyed pursuant to the Act of 1891, and for the survey and conveyance of patents to Indians and Eskimos occupying nonmineral lands within existing towns and villages. 4 The title conveyed was inalienable without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and not subject to taxation, levy and sale, or claims of adverse occupancy. 35 The self-government provisions of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act were not applicable to Alaska until 1936.36 Because of differences in organization between communities of Alaskan natives and Indian tribes elsewhere, Congress allowed that groups of Indians in Alaska not heretofore recognized as bands or tribes, but having a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district, may organize to adopt constitutions and bylaws and to receive charters of incorporation and Federal loans under [the Indian Reorganization Act]. 37 Congress also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to designate as an Indian reservation any land previously "reserved" for the use of Indians or Eskimos, together with adjacent public lands or those occupied by Indians or Eskimos. 8 Second, the act provided that "the State of Alaska is hereby granted and shall be entitled to select, within twenty-five years" more than 103 million acres of "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved" public lands. 4 2 The second was probably the more important of the two provisions because it set the stage for the battle which culminated in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 43 In 1961 the Bureau of Indian Affairs filed the first of a flood of native protests over state selections; within a decade between 80 and 90 percent of the land in Alaska was subject to native protests or other claims.
4 4 When, in 1966, natives protested the federal sale of oil and gas leases on the North Slope, Interior Secretary Udall responded by suspending the lease sale and freezing the disposition of all federal land in Alaska until native claims were settled. 4 The act proscribed the operation of "any distillery for manufacturing ardent spirits,"1 64 and forbade any person to "sell, exchange, or give, barter or dispose of, any spirituous liquor or wine to an Indian,"' 5 in the Indian country. It continued the requirement of a license to reside or trade within the Indian country, 6 and declared that "no purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the constitution." 67
Alaska as "Indian Country"
At the time of the enactment of the 1834 Intercourse Act the United States included only that portion east of the Mississippi River plus those portions known as the Louisiana Purchase 6 " and the Red River Country. 69 The rest of what is now the fifty states was acquired through annexation in 1845 and 1898,70 by agreement with Britain in 1846, ' 76 the trial court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the 1834 Act had never been extended expressly to Alaska and, therefore, was inapplicable. The United States District Attorney had argued for the United States that Alaska was part of the Indian country, both because it was inhabited by Indians and because the 1834 Act had been extended over Alaska, proprio vigore, at the time of its cession from Russia.
The "Indian Country" is only that portion of the United States or its territories, which has been declared to be such by an act of congress. . . ."I It has been so common a habit of congress upon the acquisition of territory to specially extend the laws of the United States over it,... that if congress had intended this or any other provision of the intercourse act to be in force in Alaska, it would, in accordance with its common practice, have so declared.... .
There was precedent for this holding in United States v. Tom, 9
where the supreme court of the Territory of Oregon had held that the 1834 Intercourse Act had effect in Oregon only by virtue of its having been extended by the Act of 1850. 
The Mexican Cession
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Published [A]ll the country described by the act of 1834 as Indian country remains Indian country so long as the Indians retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different provision by treaty or by act of Congress. 8 The Court in Crow Dog held that this definition applied to all the country to which the Indian title has not been extinguished within the limits of the United States, even when not within a reservation expressly set apart for the exclusive occu- [Vol. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/4 ALASKAN NATIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS pancy of Indians, although much of it has been acquired since the passage of the act of 1834, and notwithstanding the formal definition in that act has been dropped from the statutes, excluding, however, any territory embraced within the exterior geographical limits of a State, not excepted from its jurisdiction by treaty or by statute, at the time of its admission into the Union, but saving, even in respect to territory not thus excepted and actually in the exclusive occupancy of Indians, the authority of Congress over it, under the constitutional power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and under any treaty made in pursuance of it."' Although this definition seems to include Alaska, a circuit court three years later in Kie v. United States" ruled that Alaska was not Indian country except for purposes of sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 Intercourse Act. Kie had been convicted of manslaughter, alleged to have been committed in 1884 in Juneau. On appeal he argued that the killing had taken place within Indian country and was therefore not punishable pursuant to sections 2145 and 2146 of the Revised Statutes. Noting the Seveloff case and the subsequent extension of sections 20 and 21 over Alaska by Congress, the court concluded that "this legislation . . . is equivalent to a declaration that Alaska is not to be considered 'Indian country,' only so far as concerns the introduction and disposition of spirituous liquors therein." 8 9
The Intercourse Acts in Alaska
Whether a particular area of Alaska is Indian country is now largely a question of only academic interest. The applicability of most provisions of the 1834 Intercourse Act in Alaska has never been considered directly by the courts. Substantial judicial authority, as well as congressional practice, indicates that particular provisions are not in effect unless they have been expressly extended." Congress did extend two sections of the 1834 Act in 187392 and, by enactment of 18 U.S.C. sections 1151-1165 in 1948, made applicable certain criminal provisions of the 1834 Act. 93 However, neither Congress nor the courts have ever declared the balance of its provisions to be in effect in Alaska.
It seems anomalous that federal laws general on their face should apply to one area within the United States but not to another. The explanation of the courts, that laws must be extended expressly to newly acquired territory for them to apply, provides only a partial answer. Further explanation lies in the fact that the Intercourse acts are an exercise of congressional power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 4 Failure to extend the bulk of the provisions of the 1834 Act to Alaska reflected an apparent determination to regulate commerce with Alaskan natives differently in some respects than with Indian tribes elsewhere.
Native Property Rights in Alaska
By having failed to extend section 12 of the 1834 Intercourse [Vol. 8
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Act to Alaska, 95 Congress declined to deny Alaskan natives the power to alienate their lands. Alaskan natives did in fact alienate lands, and courts upheld the transfers except in cases where the federal government sought to set aside the conveyances as fraudulent. 96 The transfers were not of aboriginal title, however, but of rights created by special congressional legislation. The most important of these rights were created by section 8 of the 1884 Alaska Organic Act. 9 7
Judicial Interpretation of the 1884 Organic Act
One of the earliest cases to interpret the 1884 Act suggested that it was express recognition of the "right of the American citizen to go onto public lands, occupy, possess, use, and improve the same, with the view of ultimately obtaining title." 98 The court appears to have been referring to a settler's right of preemption on the public domain. 
19801
Published Six years later in Russian-American Co. v. United States, 04 the Supreme Court found it "quite clear" that section 8 of the 1884 Act had "recognized the rights of such Indians or other persons as were in possession of lands at the time of the passage of the act, and reserved to them the power to acquire title thereto after future legislation had been enacted by Congress." 05 In that case the packing company had settled and erected improvements on Afognak Island in 1889. When later that year the United States reserved the island as a fish culture station, the company claimed that it had a vested right to a patent under section 8 of the 1884 Act. The Court responded that since the company "did not take possession of this land until five years after the act 6f 1884 was passed, it was a mere trespasser."'
The packing company also claimed rights under the Act of March 3, 1891, providing for the issuance of patents to persons occupying lands "for the purpose of trade or manufactures."
7
The Court replied that "although the occupation and cultivation of public lands with a view to preemption confers a preference over others in the purchase of such lands by the bona fide settler," it conferred no rights against the United States. 08 It is clear that the Court did not think that the 1884 Organic Act had "recognized" a settler's preemptive rights because it clearly recognized that such rights could be acquired only by settlers under the preemption laws, providing for the settlement and sale of the public domain. "[Flar from Congress intending by this act to invite a settlement upon public lands in Alaska, a contrary inference arises from a subsequent clause of section 8, that 'nothing contained in this act shall be construed to put in force in said JDistrict the general land laws of the United States. 
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The leading case where the rights of natives under the 1884 Act were at issue was Sutter v. Heckman.I' There a bill in equity was brought to restrain the Alaska Packers Association from interfering with fishing rights inuring to certain uplands on the Tongass Narrows. Plaintiffs claimed ownership of the land and fishing rights through a chain of deeds originating in a quit-claim deed from a native, alleged to have been in possession at the enactment of the 1884 Act. The district court found that the original grantor had in fact occupied part of the land claimed. As to that part, the deed from the native had "conveyed his possessory rights and his fishing rights, whatever they were . . . [ 
1980]
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sons] the power to acquire title,"'' 6 indicating that such persons had obtained vested rights to title. In 1947, in Miller v. United States, the Ninth Circuit adopted the position that the 1884 Act was a grant of such vested rights and held that these rights were property interests requiring fifth amendment compensation for their taking." 7 As recently as 1970, the Ninth Circuit cited its holding in Heckman along with Shively v. Bowlby to support its holding that the United States "[w]hile holding the country as a territory . . . might even grant rights in and titles to lands which normally would go to a state on its admission."" ' 8 Comparison of the language of the three "dispositive" provisions of section 8 of the 1884 Act supports such a construction of a grant of vested rights to title. Persons with mining claims were allowed to perfect them under the general mining laws, whereas missionaries were only to be "continued in occupancy" pending "action by Congress."" 9 Significantly, "Indians and other persons" were to be protected in possession of lands actually used, occupied, or claimed, with only "the terms under which such persons may acquire title"' 20 reserved for future congressional legislation.
The 1884 Organic Act and Aboriginal Title
It is important to note that none of the cases construing the 1884 Act distinguished between natives and other persons. 23 To the extent that lands claimed by aboriginal title are coterminous with lands in which communal rights are held under the 1884 legislation, what is the effect of the 1884 Act on aboriginal title? It is possible that the 1884 grants were merely intended to supplement the natives' aboriginal claims, giving them alternative bases on which to assert their rights. On the other hand, the grants may have acted, either directly or through subordinating aboriginal tenure to federal tenure, to supplant possessory rights under aboriginal tenure with equal rights under federal tenure.
The classical concept of aboriginal title is that of a possessory proprietary interest inuring in tribes by virtue of aboriginal use and occupancy "from time immemorial." The right to possession is held under aboriginal tribal tenure, not federal or state tenure, until it might be legitimately extinguished, usually through cession by treaty to the United States in favor of the holder of the "preemption right" or "naked fee."' 24 Such a cession to the federal government is an intertenurial transfer of property, as well as a cession of territory, and is the source of the right to possession within the federal and state tenure systems.' 
1980]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980 Since the land grants are not within any reservation, the sovereign powers of the tribes are explainable only if they are aboriginal, notwithstanding that the tribes are understood to hold their titles in fee simple absolute, rather than by aboriginal tenure. 2 7 This suggests that a grant of a possessory interest to an aboriginal possessor may effectively transform the aboriginal quality of the right to possession.
It seems more than coincidence that within three years of the 1884 Organic Act, Congress forged a paradigmatic shift in its general Indian policy. Through passage of the Major Crimes Act of 1885128 and the General Allotment Act of 1887,129 Congress clearly initiated a new policy of intervention in internal tribal affairs, claiming the right to exercise jurisdiction over matters that previously had been within the exclusive realm of the tribes. It is suggested that the 1884 Organic Act was but another manifestation of this shift in Indian policy. By granting rights under federal tenure to natives and others in Alaska, Congress asserted the right to disregard the aboriginal tenure system and protect possessory interests on its own terms. This is particularly apparent considering that both native and nonnative possession was protected on exactly the same te rms. Any conflict with aboriginal rights is wholly abstract, however, because such grants are completely consistent with native possession. The conflict is not with the aboriginal right to possession, which is protected, but with the sovereign aboriginal right to determine tenure without interference by another sovereign. Even this conflict is more apparent than real. As long as the United States asserts the right to forbid transfer of tribal land and claims the right of eminent domain over aboriginal lands, the difference between aboriginal title and possessory rights under federal or state tenure is merely descriptive, not substantive. The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit had held that the United States had never recognized aboriginal title within the area of the Mexican Cession and that absent such recognition aboriginal title could not be asserted against a grantee of the United States.' 32 In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court rejected both this theory and the railroad's theory that aboriginal title need be "based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal government action.""' The Court reasoned that if the Hualapais' aboriginal interest had not been extinguished prior to the date the title of the railroad's predecessor attached, then its predecessor "took the fee subject to the encumbrance of Indian title."' 34 Disputing that the policy of the United States "of respecting such Indian title" was nonexistent in the Mexican Cession, the Court pointed to the fact that the 1834 Intercourse Act had been extended over the tribes in the New Mexico and Utah territories in 1851. "The Act of 1851 obviously did not create any Indian right of occupancy which did not previously exist. But it plainly indicates that in 1851 Congress desired to continue in these territories the unquestioned general policy of the Federal Government to recognize such right of occupancy." 13 5 The Court held that the Hualapais' aboriginal title had not been extinguished by the time the railroad grant had attached in 1872; the railroad's predecessor therefore had taken the fee en- 
cumbered by aboriginal title. However, the Hualapais' subsequent request for and acceptance of a reservation in 1883 was held to have been an effective abandonment of their aboriginal interest outside the reservation. The railroad recently had quitclaimed its interest in lands within the reservation to the United States, and the Court accordingly ordered an accounting with respect to only those lands. 3 ,
Tillamooks I and II
Five years later, in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,1'" the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of whether compensation was required for the taking by the United States without tribal consent of lands held by aboriginal title. Three Justices joined in the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson in requiring compensation under the fifth amendment, finding that "[a] contrary decision would ignore the plain import in traditional methods of extinguishing Indian title."' 38 Noting that the "early acquisition of Indian lands, in the main, progressed by a process of negotiation and treaty," and that it had been "usual policy not to coerce the surrender of lands without consent and without compensation," Vinson concluded that "[s]omething more than sovereign grace prompted the obvious regard given to original Indian title." 1 39 Two Justices joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice Reed, adopting the theory of the United States that compensation was required only where aboriginal title had received "some definite act of sovereign acknowledgment."'"" According to the dissent:
The character of Indian occupancy of tribal lands is at least of two kinds: first, occupancy as aborigines until that occupancy is interrupted by governmental order; and second, occupancy when by an act of Congress they are given a definite area as a place upon which to live. When Indians receive recognition of their right to occupy lands by act of Congress, they have a right of occupancy which cannot be taken from them without compensation. But by the other type of occupancy, it may be 136. The Court without explanation failed to order an accounting as to lands outside the reservation for the period between 1872 and 1883. See 10 GEo. WASH This view of aboriginal title was rejected by four of the seven Justices who addressed the issue; seven out of eight Justices rejected Justice Black's theory that the jurisdictional act under which suit had been brought itself had compelled compensation; and the Court was split four to four over Chief Justice Vinson's contention that compensation was being awarded under the fifth amendment.' 4 2 Nevertheless, some authorities read the case as standing for a right to compensation under the fifth amendment. 1 43 When Tillamooks came before the Court again four years later on the issue of whether interest was required on the award, the Court held per curiam that no interest was due because it was not a fifth amendment case. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas adopted the Tee-HitTons' argument and insisted that "[t]he conclusion seems clear that Congress in the 1884 Act recognized the claims of these Indians to their Alaskan lands."' 63 However, neither the majority nor the dissent cited any case law pertaining to the 1884 Act except for Miller, which the majority misread and the dissent never mentioned.
The majority appeared confident in ruling against the Tee-HitTons. "Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian occupancy of Government owned land rather than making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle.' ' 64 Congress eventually was more sympathetic toward the Alaskan natives than the Supreme Court and legislated the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,' 65 but the Tee-Hit-Ton decision remains as the leading case on aboriginal title and the fifth amendment. Ironically, the Court was probably correct in denying the TeeHit-Tons' aboriginal title claims, but it was entirely mistaken as to the applicable law.
The Tee-Hit-Ton Case Examined
The Tee-Hit-Ton decision is but one of many deciding what is "property" for the purpose of the fifth amendment. The approach adopted by the Court to dispose of the Tee-Hit-Tons' claim, i.e., denying that the interest involved constitutes "property," has been used often in cases involving the navigation servitude,' 6 " zoning restrictions, 167 tivity.' " Use of the "no property" approach in Tee-Hit-Ton was a radical departure from its use in these contexts where claims to uses of real property of acknowledged ownership were at issue. In Tee-Hit-Ton, ownership of the realty itself was the basic dispute.
Aside from the Court's basic approach to the fifth amendment, Justice Reed's analysis in Tee-Hit-Ton suffers from three fundamental errors that render his analysis extremely questionable. First, Reed's reliance upon Johnson v. McIntosh' 6 9 to support his "well-settled" propositions regarding aboriginal title has caused perplexity and confusion in the theory of aboriginal title ever since."17 Far from being "derived" from McIntosh, as Reed urged, the rule of Tee-Hit-Ton actually is at odds with that case. In McIntosh, plaintiffs sued for ejectment of defendant, who held the land in question under a grant from the United States. Plaintiffs claimed ownership of the land by purchase from an Indian tribe made prior to the cession of the land by the tribe, through treaty, to the United States. Among several grounds of decision," 7 ' the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' interest had been eclipsed by the subsequent cession of the land involved by the tribe. Chief Justice Marshall explained that "the person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws." ' 72 Although at the time it was a common practice for 170. See Henderson, supra note 2; Hookey, supra note 2, at 101. 171. The Court held plaintiffs' title invalid on at least two other grounds. The holding most commonly referred to was that the tribes could not convey a complete title because their "power to dispose of the soil, at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it." 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). But see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832), where Marshall reformulated the discovery principle: "It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed to it ....
It gave an exclusive right to purchase, but did not fdund that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell." (Emphasis added.)
As a second ground for decision in McIntosh, the Court held that the Royal Proclamation of 1763, applicable because plaintiffs' purchases had been before the American Revolution, had reserved the lands claimed by plaintiffs to the tribes and forbidden purchase by British subjects. 
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tribes expressly to reserve in a treaty of cession any prior vested rights they wished to protect,'7 the treaty involved in McIntosh did not contain any such provision. 7 4 Marshall held that the treaty therefore had operated to eclipse the plaintiffs' interest and to transfer the lands to the United States free of any encumbrance. The cession by the tribe without reservation of plaintiffs' rights had been an act of eminent domain. According to Marshall, "If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceeding. We know of no principle which can distinguish this case from a grant made to a native Indian. ..,, In McIntosh, Marshall explicitly recognized that a tribe's aboriginal proprietary interest exists within its own tenure system. This tenure system is not only separate from that of the federal government, but is actually a source of rights to the federal tenure system. 176 In Tee-Hit-Ton, Reed assumed that all rights were held under federal tenure. Failing to find an aboriginal property interest within federal tenure, Reed declared that specific congressional action was required to create one. According to one commentator:
[T]he Court inaugurated a new judicial test of aboriginal property: the legal theory that Congress has the sole right to delegate to the Indian tribes their rights to aboriginal titles. Aboriginal title did not exist, then, because of the tribes' "original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial," as stated in Worcester. Rather, under the Court's new theory of aboriginal title, it was vested in Congress. '"' Second, Justice Reed failed to consider that the "specific recognition" test he championed in Tillamooks I and Tee-HitTon also had been urged upon the Court in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry. ,1 where the Court unanimously had rejected it. The Court there held that the railroad grantee had received fee ti-tie from the United States encumbered by the Hualapais' aboriginal title. The Court years earlier had held that a grant in fee of aboriginal title lands operates to convey the fee encumbered by aboriginal title. 179 It is submitted that a possessory encumbrance on a fee simple estate, which also is indefeasible by the holder of the fee, is tantamount to "property" by any generally applicable definition. This being so, Santa Fe implicitly precluded any requirement of "specific recognition" for such an interest to be compensable. Santa Fe did not hold that recognition was never necessary, however. Rather, the Court found that the extension of, inter alia, sections 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the 1834 Intercourse Act over the Territory of New Mexico clearly indicated Congress' intention to continue there "the unquestioned general policy of the Federal Government to recognize [the Indian] right of occupancy."' 81 When this is considered in light of the holding in Kie v. United States'1 2 that only sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 Act were ever extended over Alaska, it is apparent that Alaskan natives never came within the policy of recognizing aboriginal title found by the Court in Santa Fe, although they did receive protection from other sources. Justice Reed, therefore, could have distinguished Santa Fe by holding what it had implied, that Intercourse Act protection was necessary for aboriginal title to be asserted as property. At any rate, Tee-Hit-Ton can have decided nothing more than that a taking of aboriginal title not subject to Intercourse Act protection is not compensable. If the Court continues to require "recognition," it remains to be seen whether the Inter-' course acts might not be sufficient recognition of aboriginal title so as to render it compensable property.
Finally 
